Bouarfa v. Mayorkas (Immigration)

Bouarfa v. Mayorkas (Decided December 10, 2024)
In Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, the Supreme Court addressed whether federal courts have jurisdiction to review the revocation of a previously approved visa petition under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The case involved Amina Bouarfa, a U.S. citizen, whose petition for her noncitizen spouse was revoked by USCIS upon suspicion of a prior sham marriage. The agency cited its authority under 8 U.S.C. §1155 to revoke approvals “for good and sufficient cause.”

The Court unanimously held that the Secretary of Homeland Security’s revocation of a visa petition is a discretionary action falling under §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which precludes judicial review of such agency decisions. Justice Jackson, writing for the Court, emphasized that the broad statutory language granting discretion to revoke a visa petition reflects clear congressional intent to shield these decisions from court oversight.

This ruling underscores Congress' authority to limit procedural protections in immigration matters when decisions are entrusted to agency discretion. 

Justice Jackson writing for a unanimous Court. 

Read by RJ Dieken.

Transcript

 BOUARFA v. MAYORKAS, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 23–583. Argued October 15, 2024—Decided December 10, 2024 Amina Bouarfa, a U. S. citizen, began the process of obtaining permanent legal residence for Ala’a Hamayel, her noncitizen spouse, by filing a visa petition with the U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Relevant here, USCIS “shall . . . approve” a visa petition if it “determines that the facts stated in the petition are true” and that the noncitizen is the petitioner’s spouse. 8 U. S. C. §1154(b) (emphasis added). But if the noncitizen has previously sought or received an immigration benefit “by reason of a marriage determined by the Attorney General to have been entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws”—known as the sham-marriage bar—the agency must deny the petition. §1154(c). USCIS initially approved Bouarfa’s visa petition. Two years later, the agency sent Bouarfa a Notice of Intent to Revoke its approval based on evidence suggesting that her husband had previously entered into a marriage for the purpose of evading immigration laws. Although Bouarfa vigorously denied the evidence, the agency revoked its prior approval based on the Secretary of Homeland Security’s statutory authority under §1155 to “revoke the approval of any petition” “for good and sufficient cause.” The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the revocation, finding that USCIS’s determination that Hamayel had entered into a prior sham marriage that would have prevented initial approval of the petition under §1154(c) constituted “good and sufficient cause” for revocation under §1155. Bouarfa challenged the agency’s revocation in federal court. The District Court dismissed the suit, holding that §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)—a provision that strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain discretionary agency decisions—barred judicial review of the agency’s revocation. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 
 Held: Revocation of an approved visa petition under §1155 based on a sham-marriage determination by the Secretary is the kind of discretionary decision that falls within the purview of §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain actions “in the discretion of ” the agency. Pp. 6–12. (a) Section 1155 is a quintessential grant of discretion: The Secretary “may” revoke a previously approved visa petition “at any time” for what the Secretary deems “good and sufficient cause.” Such a broad grant of authority “fairly exudes deference” to the Secretary and is similar to other statutes held to “ ‘commi[t]’” a decision “‘to agency discretion.’ ” Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, 600. Congress did not impose specific criteria or conditions limiting this authority, nor did it prescribe how or when the Secretary must act. Context reinforces the discretionary nature of §1155. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s neighboring provision, §1252(a)(2)(B)(i), bars judicial review under specific provisions, each of which contains language indicating that the decisions involved are entrusted to the discretion of the Attorney General. Section 1155 contains similar language. Pp. 6–8. (b) Bouarfa argues that although some revocations are discretionary, the revocation here was not, so §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not apply to preclude judicial review. Bouarfa contends that once the Secretary approves a petition and later determines that the beneficiary had previously entered into a sham marriage, the Secretary has no choice but to revoke the agency’s approval. Neither the statutory text nor its context limits the Secretary’s discretion in this way.  (1) Contrary to Bouarfa’s argument, §1154(c)’s text nowhere creates an ongoing duty for the agency to continually confirm that its initial approval was sound. Instead, §1154(c)’s command to the agency extends only to the point of approval. Turning to §1154(c)’s context, Bouarfa argues that because a noncitizen may use an approved visa petition to continue along the path toward permanent residency, Congress implicitly required the agency to continually reassess its prior approval. But nothing in the statutory scheme requires revisiting past decisions of approval; rather, each stage of the process comes with its own criteria. Indeed, the specific grant of discretion in §1155 to revoke prior approval of a visa petition forecloses the argument that Congress silently mandated revocation in certain situations. Pp. 8–9. (2) Bouarfa’s assertion that the Secretary always revokes the agency’s approval of a visa petition if the agency later makes a shammarriage determination makes no difference because Congress did not make the availability of judicial review dependent on agency practice. Rather, §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review of decisions “made discretionary by legislation.” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 246–247 (emphasis added). Nor is it unreasonable to suggest that Congress  created a system in which a sham-marriage determination is subject to judicial review when an agency denies a visa petition but not when the agency revokes a prior approval. That distinction “reflects Congress’ choice to provide reduced procedural protection for discretionary relief.” Patel v. Garland, 596 U. S. 328, 345. Pp. 9–11. (3) Precedent, likewise, does not mandate Bouarfa’s interpretation. Unlike the discretionary determination at issue in Patel v. Garland, §1155’s revocation authorization has no “threshold requirements” to access the relevant discretion, id., at 332, 347, so Patel does not help Bouarfa. Finally, because the presumption that administrative action is subject to judicial review may be overcome by “ ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of congressional intent to preclude judicial review,” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221, 229, there is no need to resort to the presumption of reviewability where, as here, “the statute is clear,” Patel, 596 U. S., at 347. Pp. 11–12. 75 F. 4th 1157, affirmed. JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.